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International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions:
The Grand Theory of Compliance with International
Law
Joel P. Trachtman*

"[A] prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he,
where such fidelity would damage him, and when the
reasons that made him promise are no longer relevant."
Niccolo Machiavelli'
"Applied to relations between nations, [the] bureaucratic
politics model directs attention to intra-national games,
the overlap of which constitutes international relations."
Graham Allison2

Abstract
Compliance with international law is always dependent upon a contemporaneous
domestic political decision to comply. This Article articulates the importance of the
interdependence between home-state domestic politics and forezgn-state domestic politics in
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determining compliance. International legal commitments allow the formation of domestic
coalitions between those who will benefit from their own state's compliance with the
internationallegal rule, and those who will benefit from other states' compliance with the
internationallegal rule. This Article extends the rationalist approach to compliance with
internationallaw to the domestic politics of the target state. The theof developed in this Article
builds on established approaches to internationalrelations in the politicalscience literature, in
particularthe "liberal" theog of internationalrelations associated with Andrew Moracsik,
the two-level game theof approach associated with Robert Putnam, and the "second image
reversed" approach associated with Peter Gourevitch. This Article extends these approaches (i)
from broaderinternationalrelations to internationallaw and (ii)from adherence to compliance.
The model advanced in this Article allows the formaliZation and contextualiZation of a variety
offactors that up to now have been viewed in isolation as explanatog variables in the decision
to comply. Poligmakers can use this model as an analytical template by which to assess
whether their counterpartieswould comply with any undertakings they may make.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If international law is to be a useful tool of international cooperation, we
must know more about its social effects: its ability to cause states to take action
that they would not have taken, or to refrain from taking action that they would
have taken but for the existence of the international law rule. Greater
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understanding of the effects of international law will allow more efficient
allocation of diplomatic and analytical resources toward international law that
will resolve international problems and will reduce uncertainty that may result in
under-use of international law as a tool of cooperation. However, greater
understanding will require greater particularity of analysis.
This Article proposes a social scientific theory of compliance with
international law that focuses attention on the domestic politics underlying a
state's decision to comply with a particular international legal rule. It develops
further a preference-based model that describes the internal mechanisms of state
compliance with international law, building on work in political science by Dai,
Gourevitch, Moravcsik, lida, Milner, Mo, Putnam, and others who have been
instrumental in developing a two-level game-based theory of international
cooperation. That political science literature focuses on cooperation in the form
of adherence to a "rule." Except for the work by Dai, however, the literature does
not examine the subsequent issue of compliance with the rule. The two extensions
of this work made in this Article-from broader international relations to
international law, and from adherence to compliance-help to illuminate the
problem of compliance, and provide a social scientific, positive approach to
compliance.
Most prior social scientific theories of compliance with international law
take the structure of the state's aggregate utility function as a given and evaluate
the circumstances under which the threat of retaliation, or perhaps the fear of
reduced reputation or reduced opportunities for future cooperation, would
provide incentives for compliance. These theories fail to examine how
international legal rules, and how the compliance with international legal rules,
advance the interests of different constituencies within the target state. This
Article departs from this preference-based literature of compliance with
international law in that the prior literature declined to open the black box of the
state in order to see the internal workings of the domestic political process.' It
argues that domestic politics plays an important role in determining
compliance-a role that cannot be ignored.
The basic premise of this Article is that the proximate cause of compliance
is a domestic political decision to engage in the behavior that constitutes
compliance. At the moment at which international law is made-at the moment
of adherence-two politico-legal acts take place: (i) there is a domestic decision to

3

While an approach that ignores domestic politics might be seen as an appropriate simplification
because it allows a more parsimonious theory which can still generate interesting hypotheses, this
argument has not been sufficiently tested. See, for example, Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global
Legaksm 41 (Chicago 2009) (suggesting, without explanation, that this simplification is indeed
appropriately parsimonious).
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adhere to the international legal rule-to, in effect, enact the international legal
rule as a national measure,' and (ii) there is ordinarily an international decision to
reciprocate or engage in concerted enactment. These two acts are generally
interdependent at the time of adherence. This Article explains that the
interdependence between domestic politics and foreign politics is important at
the time of compliance as well.
Where the international legal literature has approached internal political
decisions to comply, its focus has been on narrow mechanisms of internal
pressure, such as private rights to sue, networks, or NGOs, rather than on
broader coalition politics.s Alternatively, the international legal literature has
focused on mechanisms to indoctrinate or modify the preferences of
governments, often assuming that governments are autonomous vis-t-vis their
constituencies, rather than on an approach that examines the domestic political
mechanisms that result in the preferences of governments. This "constructivist"
international law literature of two-level compliance includes work by Harold
Koh, Abram and Antonia Chayes, and Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks.
However, this literature does not focus on preferences expressed within
domestic politics, or as political scientists would put it, "power and interest," but
instead focuses on idea-based, bureaucratic, managerial, and cultural mechanisms
that are thought to affect behavior, perhaps by changing preferences. This is
certainly an alternative channel for causation of state behavior. Future empirical
work will be required to evaluate which channel of causation has greater effects
and under which circumstances.
The unitary model of the state-often associated with the realist approach
to international relations-is ignorant of the domestic political dynamics that
constitute the decision whether or not to comply. The realist model assumes an
overwhelming drive toward security that eclipses other state preferences and is
intentionally ignorant of political coalitions. However, as Milner has argued,
"international negotiations to realize cooperation often fail because of domestic
politics, and such negotiations are often initiated because of domestic politics." 6
Milner's central claim in her 1997 book is that "states are not unitary actors; that
is, they are not strictly hierarchical but are polyarchic, composed of actors with

4

This enactment may occur by virtue of a variety of methods, including according the international
law domestic legal effect by virtue of either direct effect or a domestic measure that transposes it
into the domestic legal system.

5

See, for example, Anne Van Aaken, Effectuating Public InternationalLaw Through Market Mechanisms,
165 J Institutional & Theoretical Econ 33, 44 (2009).
Helen V. Milner, Interests, Instituions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations 10

6

(Princeton 1997).
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varying preferences who share power over decision making."' There is no
unified, ex ante national interest. The national interest is the result of a domestic
political process, taking into account opportunities and risks in the international
"market."
The unitary model of the state may have been a reasonable simplifying
assumption in international relations theory when most governments ruled and
determined policy independently of domestic constituents' desires. It may have
made sense when governments often acted independently of domestic political
dynamics and when most international law was concerned with "beyond the
border" rather than "inside the border" issues. The unitary model may still be
reasonable in circumstances where there is great national unity, as in existential
national security circumstances.
But in a post-realist world, where governments seek all types of gains and
are increasingly accountable servants of their constituents, the structure of their
accountability-the mechanism by which these agents are instructed and held to
account with respect to their objectives-becomes a critical variable in
international relations and international law. Therefore, in order to predict
whether a state will or will not comply with an international legal rule and to
construct international legal rules, remedies, and institutions that are relevant to
the decision of the state to comply, it is necessary to examine the domestic
coalitions that drive the decision whether or not to comply.
Domestic politics has long been understood to determine the decision of
states to accept international legal obligations. This is clearest in connection with
the decision of a state to enter a treaty, such as the Kyoto Protocol or the
League of Nations Charter. But it has been insufficiently understood that the
decision to enter into international legal obligations itself can transform
domestic politics by enabling the formation of coalitions that otherwise could
not be formed.' Nor has it been understood that over time, the decision to
comply with these obligations is dependent on the continuity and robustness of
these coalitions. Compliance with international law can be analyzed by reference
to the domestic political coalitions that exist in order to induce entry into the
international legal rules, as well as those that will be precipitated by the
establishment of the international legal rule.
International legal commitments allow the formation of coalitions between
those who will benefit from their own state's compliance with the international

7

Id at 11.

8

For a recent effort to do so, focusing on the relationship between Congress and the Executive in
the US, see Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 Va L Rev
251, 263-68 (2006). See also Beth Simmons, Mobilizng ForHuman Rights 23-56 (Cambridge 2009)
(examining the role of human rights law in empowering domestic human rights advocates).
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legal rule in question ("direct beneficiaries" of compliance) and those who will
benefit from other states' compliance with the international legal rule ("indirect
beneficiaries" of compliance by virtue of reciprocity). For example, international
trade treaties are supported by a coalition between consumers of imported
goods-who are direct beneficiaries because they benefit from reduced domestic
barriers to imports-and producers of goods for export-who are indirect
beneficiaries because they benefit from reduced foreign barriers. The reduced
foreign barriers may be jeopardized by non-compliance of the home state. As
Grossman and Helpman put it at the conclusion of their leading work on the
political economy of protectionism in trade:
A next step might be to assess the relative desirability of alternative
international "rules of the game." Such rules limit the policy choices open to
national governments and change the nature of the strategic interactions
between elected officials and their constituents. Our framework could be
used to generate predictions about what domestic policies will emerge from
the political process in different [international] institutional settings, and
therefore to evaluate which rules give rise to preferred policy outcomes.9
In addition to specific coalitions for specific commitments, there are
coalitions that support compliance with international law more generally. For
example, in the US, one of the main roles of the American Society of
International Law (ASIL) is to lobby and engage in public education programs in
support of international law.o In addition, the entry into international legal
obligations triggers support for compliance with the obligations. Moreover,
ASIL's general activities and orientation support both adherence to, and
compliance with, international law. What motivates these lobbyists? There may
be constructivist explanations, or explanations in terms of certain values.
Alternatively, these lobbyists may be seeking to increase the importance of their
own advice, in pursuit of respect, power, or money.
One type of example of the domestic coalition theory of compliance
involves a circumstance where a government seeks to perpetuate its policy by
using the power of international law to restrict the actions of subsequent
governments. The entry by Mexico into NAFTA, and the entry by China into
the WTO, may illustrate this type of behavior. In these cases, the relevant
government sought to use international law to maintain the strength of domestic
forces in favor of liberalization. Indeed, it may be that the formation of
international law, plus a degree of compliance, increases the welfare and thus

9
10

Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Protectionfor Sale, 84 Am Econ Rev 833, 849 (1994).
See Frederic L. Kirgis, The American Sodety of International Law's First Century: 1906-2006 551-59
(Nijhoff 2006). While the ASIL itself has declined to take formal positions in most specific
matters since 1966, many of its members, and other lobbyists, may advocate entry into
international legal obligations.
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strengthens the lobbying position of both direct beneficiaries and indirect
beneficiaries, producing a circumstance under which adherence leads to greater
support for compliance. Furthermore, systematic interests in compliance, either
on the part of a public international law lobby, or on the part of the government
itself, are likely to be anticipated to produce the "lock-in" effect that the
Mexican and Chinese governments sought.
A theory of formation and compliance with international law that focuses
on the role of domestic political coalitions achieves important theoretical
advances. First, as suggested above, it allows for the possibility of greater
explanatory and predictive power than "unitary state" theories of compliance.
Second, it encompasses the role of individuals in domestic politics, and therefore
moves toward a more liberal and cosmopolitan understanding of the role and
dynamics of international law. A domestic coalition-based theory of international
law transcends the state and examines individual preferences, but takes the state
as the partial mediator of individual preferences.
On the other hand, it is clear that domestic politics about the formation of
and compliance with international law is fundamentally different from most
other domestic politics. This is because domestic politics about formation of and
compliance with international law must concern itself with the responsive
actions of other states. International law that involves commitments by other
states by definition involves the contribution of value, or the taking of value, by
other states. This difference contributes to a different political equilibrium from
that which would be possible if the only exchanges of political value took place
within the state.
To generalize, in order for international agreements to be entered into,
negotiators must engage the domestic politics of member states. Entry into such
agreements requires the assembly of domestic coalitions that have the political
power to approve international agreements that will be acceptable to foreign
counter-parties. In order to convince foreign counter-parties to engage in
reciprocal concessions, it often will require the assembly or contingent assembly
of domestic coalitions that have the political power to induce continued
compliance with the relevant agreement. Compliance coalitions may be
supported, in part or in whole, by international legal commitments that include
the threat of specific or diffuse, formal or informal retaliation, or of other types
of consequences. But the important point is that these internationalconsequences
operate through the medium of domestic politics to induce behavioral change in
the relevant government policy.
Of course, it is true that not all decisions are made in an intensely
contested political lobbying setting. Any approach focusing on domestic politics
must be sensitive to comparative politics across states, and to different political
structures established to address different issues within states.
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Furthermore, some decisions are made by administrative agencies, and
some decisions are made by courts, both at some distance from the full brunt of
legislative lobbying. To the extent of this removal, a different model would be
required, examining the objective functions of these decision-makers. For
example, in an area in which international law is accorded direct effect, the
courts themselves, and the supporters of the judicial system, would be more
extensively engaged in seeking to influence political decisions regarding
compliance. Similarly, if decisions are committed to administrative agencies,
perhaps a network approach along the lines advanced by Anne-Marie
Slaughter," or a more managerial approach along the lines advanced by Abram
and Antonia Chayes,12 would have greater explanatory power. For some types of
decisions, a hybrid model may be appropriate, in which administrative agencies
or courts operate in the shadow of potential legislative action, or under
legislative supervision. The model developed in this Article is open to different
political structures in different states. The magnitude of the variables would
change, but the model itself does not.
This approach might assist our understanding of the changing content of
sovereignty: sovereignty in its classical sense means having a self-contained
political system, in which political actors are responsible only domestically. In
the modern sense, sovereignty is constrained or fractured precisely because there
are growing circumstances in which the best way to deliver governmental goods
and services is through arrangements with other states.
International law is a tool for linking constituencies in different states in
order to facilitate political Pareto improving transactions between constituencies
in different states, in a way that is not possible under autarchy. In this sense,
international law is a selective instrument for structuring limited functionspecific transnational political communities. Finally, the theory of compliance
developed here can also serve as the basis for a theory of international
organizations. International organizations that are delegated decision-making
power may be understood simply as wholesale, or aggregate, means of linking
domestic constituencies. Instead of doing so on a single transactional basis, like
the market, international organizations may be analogized to long-term contracts
or the firm."

11 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 18-35 (Princeton 2004) (summarizing her theory of
12

13

how governments are adjusting their operations to respond to an increasingly networked world).
See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty 109-11 (Harvard 1995)
(giving an overview of states' management strategies for improving compliance, such as
implementing dispute resolution mechanisms or providing technical assistance through
international bureaucracies).

Joel P. Trachtman, The Economic Structureof InternationalLaw 9-11 (Harvard 2008).
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Compliance by any individual state with an international legal rule is, in the
final analysis, dependent on a political decision to comply made within that
state's domestic political process. This domestic decision is both necessary and
sufficient to result in compliance. While this decision is purely a domestic
political decision, it is importantly influenced by international dynamics. These
international dynamics will include the likely response by other states to a
decision by the target state whether to comply. But importantly, these
international dynamics are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause compliance.
Their causal effects are always mediated through domestic politics.
Any decision to comply with international law or to violate international
law will have both short-term and long-term effects, and there will ordinarily be
target state constituencies that benefit from compliance and target state
constituencies that are harmed by compliance. The decision to comply will
depend on the relative influence exercised by these constituencies.
Part II of this Article develops a social scientific model of the domestic
politics of compliance with international law. Part III suggests the implications
of this model for policy, suggests directions for future research, and describes
how this model draws on, competes with, and complements prior constructivist
and rationalist approaches. Part IV concludes.
II. DEVELOPING A SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC MODEL OF THE
DOMESTIC POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In this subsection, I begin to develop this Article's model, based, in part,
on the Grossman-Helpman political support model designed for use in
connection with international trade negotiations. 14 In that model, incumbent
governments are assumed to seek to maximize a political support function. This
political support function is assumed to have two components. First, organized
interest groups are assumed to make political contributions that can assist in
reelection, providing an incentive for governments to implement policies that
enhance organized interest group welfare. Second, voters are assumed to
respond in their voting behavior to their own welfare, and so one can expect
The
some incentive to implement policies that enhance voter welfare."
government then sets its policy to aggregate a weighted sum of total

14

15

See Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Trade Wars and Trade Talks, 103 J Pol Econ 675,
678 (1995).
It may also be that politicians are civic-minded, resulting in precisely the same motivation,
assuming that the voter's utility is actually congruent with the politician's civic vision.
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contributions and aggregate social welfare. Politicians thus seek to please the
"winning" lobbies and the electorate as a whole.
I adapt the Grossman-Helpman model of the lobbying process as follows:
Each lobby, representing a particular policy decision in connection with
international law (whether for or against the adherence or compliance decision),
confronts the government with a contribution schedule. The contribution
schedule arrays contributions against policy decisions. The government then sets
a policy and collects from each lobby the appropriate contribution. "An
equilibrium is a set of contribution schedules such that each lobby's schedule
maximizes the aggregate utility of the lobby's members, taking as given the
schedules of the other lobby groups."" This model has the structure of a
common agency problem: a situation where several principals seek to influence
the behavior of a single agent. "The government here serves as an agent for the
various (and conflicting) special interest groups, while bearing a cost for
implementing an inefficient policy that stems from its accountability to the
general electorate.""
Here, for simplicity, I do not examine the distinction or the strategic
relationship between legislatures and executives: I aggregate these components
of government. I am interested here in focusing attention not on the
governmental processes or the type of government, but on the constellation of
political support. The lobbies make implicit offers relating prospective
contributions to the policies of the government.
The Grossman-Helpman model is designed to explain the effectiveness of
lobbying in regard to trade policy, and specifically, tariffs and subsidies."
Individual preferences over protectionism are assumed to arise from their
sector-specific endowments. Following Mancur Olson, there are some owners of
factors of production who are able to organize, and some who are unable to do
so." The unorganized owners of factors of production do not make
contributions, and so lack this type of influence over policy. I assume that each
lobby structures its contribution schedule to maximize the total welfare of its
members. Like Grossman and Helpman, I am first "interested in the political
equilibrium of a two-stage noncooperative game, in which the lobbies

16

Grossman and Helpman, 84 Am Econ Rev at 836 (cited in note 9).

17

Id.

18

Id at 834 ("This paper seeks to explain the equilibrium structure of trade protection. We are
interested in understanding which special interest groups will be especially successful in capturing
private benefits from the political process.").
See Mancur Olson Jr, The Logic of Collective Action: Pub/c Goods and the Theog of Groups 53-65
(Harvard 1965) (providing a model predicting under what conditions organized political groups
are likely to emerge).
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simultaneously choose their political contribution schedules in the first stage and
the government sets policy in the second." 2 0
An equilibrium will be a set of contribution schedules, one set for each
lobby, such that each one maximizes the joint welfare of its lobby's members
given the schedules set by the other lobbies and the anticipated political
optimization by the government. The structure of this menu-auction problem is
such that the policy vector chosen by the government is assumed to maximize
the joint welfare of the lobby and the government, given the contribution
schedules offered by the other lobbies.
The Grossman-Helpman model relates a lobby's equilibrium success in
obtaining protection to: (i) the state of its political organization, (ii) the ratio of
domestic output in the relevant industry to net trade, (iii) the elasticity of import
demand, (iv) the relative importance to the government of campaign
contributions versus voter welfare, and (v) the fraction of voters that belong to
the lobby group. Items (ii) and (iii) are specific to the trade context, but one
would expect to find other measures of lobby welfare in other international legal
contexts.
In their 1995 work, The Politics of Free Trade Agreements,21 Grossman and
Helpman extend their 1994 model to examine the conditions under which two
states might agree to a free trade agreement. This model uses assumptions about
the welfare effects of trade liberalization and addresses adherence rather than
compliance. Therefore, this extended model is not directly adaptable to a
general international law model of compliance. However, it provides a good
basis with which to begin.
We begin with adherence. Where it is clear that one state wants an
agreement, the analysis can be limited to the unilateral determination by the
other state. However, this simplification may be useful only in a limited range of
circumstances. States will normally contend over the distribution of the surplus
from agreement, and therefore, even a state that initially wants an agreement
may be requested to accept a level of surplus below its BATNA or reservation
price.
Grossman and Helpman assume that the status quo prior to an
international agreement is itself a domestic political equilibrium in each state.22
This assumption seems appropriate. Thus, the opportunity for an international
agreement can be understood as an exogenous shock to the existing domestic
equilibrium. The opportunity for an international agreement changes the relative
20

Grossman and Helpman, 84 Am Econ Rev at 838 (cited in note 9).

21

Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, The Poltics of Free-TradeAgreements, 85 Am Econ Rev
667 (1995).

22

Id at 668-70.
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prices. In the trade context, the possibility for foreign compliance with a
commitment to liberalize makes the price of domestic protectionism higher by
engaging the concerns of domestic producers for export.
Grossman and Helpman, in the context of establishment of a free trade
agreement, find that in order for an agreement to be entered into, there must be
a sufficient number of exporters in each country prepared to lobby for the
agreement, on the basis of the welfare gains these lobbies would achieve by
virtue of the performance by the other state of its obligations under the
agreement.23 They use the concept of a politically Pareto efficient agreement,
meaning an agreement with the property that no party could gain politically
except at the expense of the other.2 4 After they establish the Pareto frontier,
they develop a bargaining model that shows first that two states negotiating by
making alternating proposals would reach an equilibrium somewhere along the
Pareto frontier.25 The specific equilibrium selected would depend, under perfect
information, on the relative positions of the two states, including their discount
factors or degree of patience, and each state's relative aggregate welfare under
the status quo.
In the trade context where Grossman and Helpman develop their model, it
is possible to assume that specific industry groups, or lobbies, have specific types
of interests in trade policy. In the broader international law context, lobby
interests will be more diverse, and preferences cannot be assumed to be
confined to narrow wealth gains. However, there may be industry groups, ethnic
groups, or other groups that have narrower interests.
While in the Grossman-Helpman model, lobbies make their contributions
contingent on trade policy, we may generalize to assume that lobbies make their
contributions contingent on international legal policy. For example, within
domestic societies there will be a lobby group that is interested in increased
human rights in other states. While this interest may be explained in terms of
preferences, the types of preferences involved will depend on the particular legal
rule involved, and this type of interest cannot be compared directly with other
types of interests that may be measured in monetary terms. Nor are we able to
make any assumptions about the utility function of any particular group. Rather,
the only assumption that seems defensible is that each international law rule will
harm some groups and help some other groups. However, there is one type of

23

24
25

Grossman and Helpman, 84 Am Econ Rev at 847-49 (cited in note 9) (describing under what
conditions that the interests of various lobbying groups may align to make trade agreements
across coalitions and countries possible).
See Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Interest Groups and Trade Poliy 27 (Princeton 2002)
(describing the concept of a Pareto efficient agreement).
Consider Grossman and Helpman, 85 Am Econ Rev 667 (cited in note 21).
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lobby that generally appears to be in favor of international legal adherence and
compliance. 26 That type of lobby is exemplified, in the US, by the members of
ASIL. I will discuss this type of lobby in greater detail below.
It is important to recognize that, in this political Pareto efficiency-based
model, "compliance can be rational even if the country as a whole pays for it
more than benefits from it."27 And the converse is true: compliance may be
irrational, in the sense that it is not supported by sufficient political force, even if
the country as a whole benefits from it more than it pays. However, if public
welfare is included in the government's utility function, as in the GrossmanHelpman model, through the mechanism of voting, then international legal rules
that increase public welfare are more likely to meet with both adherence and
compliance. Interestingly, different governments will have different approaches
to public welfare, and their approaches may be expected to vary over time. Their
approaches will depend on their relative accountability to the public, including
the timing of elections.
A. Depth and the Adherence-Compliance Lag
The core question is, conditional upon entry into an international legal rule
at an initial time (t1), what are the circumstances under which a particular
country will comply with that legal rule at a later time (t2)? I also assume that
domestic politics change, in an "obsolescing bargains"2 8 sense. 29 Thus, the
coalition that supports adherence at t, may not have the same structure or
magnitude, and may not even support compliance, at t 2.
I assume an international legal rule with some "depth" in the sense
described in the "legalization" literature:30 the rule requires behavior that would
not occur without the added inducement that arises from operation of the rule.
In our context, the domestic political process by itself and without any effect of
international law would not decide to conform national behavior to the rule.
This is a slightly different issue from the question, addressed for example by
Grossman and Helpman, of whether the domestic political process would decide
to adhere to an international agreement. It is possible that adherence to an
26

Of course, there will be exceptions. For example, some rules of international law may be found to
be objectionable by some portion of the membership of the ASIL.

27

Xinyuan Dai, InternationalInstitutionsand NationalPolcies 6 (Cambridge 2007).

28

See Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay 46-53 (Basic Books 1971).

29

See Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare, The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of
PoliticalPressures, 106 J Pol Econ 574, 574-601 (1998) (examining the utility of trade agreements to
assist governments in opposing changing political pressure).

30

Consider Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds,
LegakiZadon and World Politics (MIT 2001).
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international agreement would be supported purely by domestic political forces,
while compliance with the same agreement would require the additional effect of
international law. Indeed, domestic adherence under "depth" for the adhering state
would presumably be conditioned on an expectation of foreign compliance,
depending on the magnitude of other, non-reciprocal, incentives for compliance.
I further assume that in order for any state to decide to comply with an
international legal rule, there must be a coalition of domestic lobbies that is
strong enough to determine national behavior. This assumption can survive the
diversity of national politics: it is not necessary to have a dominant interestgroup based politics such as that of the US for this type of model to apply.
Even autocracies involve sensitivity to political support. For simplicity's sake, I
assume that a successful coalition will encompass a majority of some function of
political support, but the actual decision rule in a particular state for a particular
matter could be less or more. I focus on lobbies more broadly, recognizing that
other mechanisms, such as courts, may play the critical role in compliance.31 For
example, once a state has a general rule of direct effect of international law, the
courts themselves become a critical, and often determinative, "lobby" in causing
compliance.
B. Information Problems with Adherence and Compliance
Xinyuan Dai has developed a model of compliance with international law,
incorporating both electoral leverage and informational advantage as sources of
influence for a domestic lobby.32 Dai models a government's compliance
decision in the context of competing domestic lobbies. Dai emphasizes the
information problem whereby lobbies cannot observe the government's action
directly. The accuracy of the lobbies' inference about the government's action
"depends on how much information they have about the policy process and
how much resources they invest in monitoring the governmental action. "3 Dai
thus develops a model in which a government's compliance decision is
determined by both the electoral leverage of the domestic lobby and the
domestic lobby's informational position.
In Dai's model, interest groups differ in (i) their preferences regarding
compliance-for example, one group may prefer a low compliance level, while
the other prefers a high compliance level-and (ii) their informational
endowments. Dai models informational endowments as a separate variable, even
though it might be that information endowments vary with the magnitude of

32

J Institutional & Theoretical Econ at 40-42 (cited in note 5).
Xinyuan Dai, Why Comp#? The Domestic ConstituengMechanism, 59 Intl Org 363, 363 (2005).

33

Id at 365.
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preferences. Her main concern is that interest groups do not perfectly observe
compliance efforts.34 However, we might speculate that in many international law
areas, interest groups would perfectly observe compliance itself
On the other hand, as in the Grossman-Helpman model, the government
official's objective function includes both private interest in re-election and
aggregate social welfare based on altruism. The expected value to the
government official of being re-elected is discounted by the probability of reelection, and by a discount factor. The inclusion of aggregate social welfare is
intended to separate this factor from concern for re-election, but is not
necessary for the central result of Dai's model." The government official's
interest in re-election makes the government official's welfare dependent on how
lobbies perceive its compliance policy.
As might be expected, because it is built into Dai's model, Dai finds that
where the group that favors compliance has greater electoral leverage and
monitoring ability, compliance increases.36 Conversely, where the group that
favors violation has greater leverage and monitoring ability, compliance
decreases. Of course, if aggregate social welfare is included in the equation, these
differences in leverage and monitoring ability are not necessarily by themselves
determinative, and the model does not tell us how to commensurate among
these different factors. Furthermore, as Dai points out, the value to the
incumbent of reelection, and her discount factor, will affect the incumbent's
susceptibility to influence by lobbies."
While recognizing the importance of Dai's reference to each lobby's
informational advantage as a source of influence, I make the simplifying
assumption that the informational advantage is either included in the measure of
political strength, or is co-variable with the magnitude of political strength or
preferences, and therefore I do not account separately for informational
advantage. Furthermore, while Dai's approach assumes that lobbies have
difficulty in assessing the degree of effort expended by government to comply, I
focus on actual measures of compliance rather than efforts towards compliance,
and assume that actual compliance is easier to measure than efforts. This will not
always be true, but it seems to be a reasonable simplification. In appropriate
circumstances, separate accounting for information would be important.

34

See id at 368, 384 (explaining that domestic interest group politics affects democratic
governments' decisions to comply and how international organizations should use this
observation to increase compliance).
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Dai, 59 Intl Org at 364.
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C. Reciprocity
A number of scholars have examined reciprocity, or retaliation, as a means
of inducing compliance with international law." This theoretical approach is
elegant and compelling: states comply with international law in order to induce
other states to comply, or in order to induce other states to continue to refrain
from retaliation. In Keohane's "specific reciprocity" (as opposed to diffuse
reciprocity) sense, there is little difference between reciprocity and retaliation.
Most work in this area has arisen from a growing rationalist debate
regarding compliance with customary international law.40 Norman and
Trachtman," for example, developed a repeated multilateral prisoner's dilemma
model of formation of, and compliance with, customary international law. This
model is based on the potential for retaliatory defection. It focuses on the
parameters of the multilateral prisoner's dilemma in the customary international
law context. These parameters include: (i) the relative value of cooperation
versus defection, (ii) the number of states effectively involved, (iii) the extent to
which increasing the number of states involved increases the value of
cooperation or the detriments of defection, including whether the particular
issue has characteristics of a commons problem, a public good, or a network
good, (iv) the information available to the states involved regarding compliance
and defection, (v) the relative patience of states in valuing the benefits of longterm cooperation compared to short-term defection, (vi) the expected duration
of interaction, (vii) the frequency of interaction, and (viii) the existence of other
bilateral or multilateral relationships among the states involved.42
Norman and Trachtman highlighted some of the characteristics of
different states' domestic politics that might affect their level of patience and
their resulting propensity to accept and comply with rules of customary
international law. However, they did not analyze the decision-making process
38

See, for example, Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony 104-05, 128-31 (Princeton 2005); Andrew
T. Guzman, How InternationalLaw Works: A Rational Choice Theog 211-12 (Oxford 2008) (listing
reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation as costs that deter states from noncompliance).
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Consider Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of InternationalLaw (Oxford 2005);
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Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 Duke L J 559 (2002); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative

States: InternationalRelations, State Responsibihty and the Problem of Custom, 42 Va J Intl L 839 (2002).
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within states or the lobbying game within states. Other rationalist approaches
focusing on retaliation are characterized by the same limitation.
The theory developed here assumes that a state complies with international
law where its domestic politics supports compliance sufficiently. The theory is
eclectic with respect to the types of interests various lobbies may have. It
recognizes that certain domestic lobbies are motivated by the possibility of direct
foreign reciprocity and other domestic lobbies are motivated by respect for
international law. As discussed in more detail below, it is possible that respect
for international law may also be understood as a special kind of diffuse
reciprocity.
A good example of the type of specific reciprocity and engagement of
domestic interests that benefit from reciprocity comes from the trade context.
As discussed by Grossman and Helpman,4 3 exporters are a domestic
constituency interested in foreign liberalization. Therefore, exporters are
concerned with domestic compliance with liberalization commitments in order
to ensure against reciprocal punishment in the form of protectionism abroad.
It is important to note that reciprocity may be complex: it is not necessarily
tit-for-tat where each state promises the same performance.4 Indeed, the
possibility for complex barter or package deals increases the set of possible
transactions. For example, while State A may be concerned with human rights in
State B, for any number of reasons, State B may be unconcerned with human
rights in State A. But State B may be concerned with trade liberalization in State
A. In fact, international law increases the opportunities for complex barter by
allowing diverse performances to be linked and supported by broad fidelity to
international law.
On the other hand, uncertainty as to which commitments the counterparty
will suspend in response to a violation would limit the likelihood that the
domestic lobby concerned with those commitments will lobby for compliance.
There may be a collective action problem among possible lobbies. One way to
reduce the effects of this collective action problem would be to designate in
advance, and specifically, the type of retaliatory action that the counter-party will
take.4 5
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Grossman and Helpman, 85 Am Econ Rev at 687 (cited in note 21).
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See Robert D. Putnam, Deplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Intl Org 427,
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D. Role of the Pro-International Law Lobby
The PILL can be included in a model of the domestic politics of
international law in the same way that other lobbies are included. The PILL may
be motivated by altruism. It may be motivated in addition or instead by an
expectation that more international law will bring more power and income to
international lawyers. This could not only cause the PILL to argue for more
international law, but also cause it to argue for more compliance, as more
compliance would be expected to evidence the importance of international law.
Evidence for the importance of international law, in turn, would add to the
prestige and income of international lawyers. Furthermore, more compliance
with international law might result in more international law, further benefiting
the PILL. It is in connection with the PILL, and with the government as a
"lobby" itself as described below, that the constructivist model may have the
greatest power: ideas and engagement may support compliance through the
PILL and the government.
For example, the mission of the ASIL "is to foster the study of
international law and to promote the establishment and maintenance of
international relations on the basis of law and justice."" So, yet another group
has incentives to lobby for adherence and compliance with international law:
professors who form a core leadership group within ASIL stand to gain from
inducing greater study of international law. Furthermore, "establishment and
maintenance of international relations on the basis of law" can and should be
understood as promoting adherence to and compliance with international law.
The PILL would thus be expected to support compliance with
international law under most circumstances. I say "most," rather than "all"
because there is an occasional debate regarding whether "legitimacy" may trump
legality, especially in connection with humanitarian intervention. 7 Putting those
exceptional circumstances aside, we might consider the PILL effect as fairly
constant across international law rules.
Furthermore, while the PILL might advocate adherence to international legal
rules in many cases, it would not advocate adherence in all cases. For example, it
would not necessarily take a position with respect to a particular state's entry
into further preferential trade agreements, into stronger intellectual property
protection treaties, or into further bilateral investment treaties. On the other
hand, the PILL might more broadly advocate adherence to more international
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law restraining the use of force or promoting human rights. However, one
would expect the PILL to advocate compliance with international law in all but the
exceptional circumstances mentioned above.
In addition to the public choice explanation of the PILL influence
described above, the PILL, and government officials, may have an altruistic or
civic-minded position, related to the fact that compliance with international law
in general may be broadly beneficial due to network effects among international
legal rules. While adherence to international law might have some network
effects also, these would appear to be weaker. Importantly, this public welfare
position may be held both by the PILL and by government officials. The PILL
may seek to educate government officials as to the public welfare effects of
compliance with international law. The altruistic position might be based on
facts or based on beliefs.
Indeed, it may be that a broad group of citizens holds the view that
compliance with international law is important, affecting their voting behavior
and therefore the behavior of government officials. A 2002 Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations survey showed that 43 percent of Americans considered
strengthening international law a "very important" foreign policy goal, while
another 43 percent rated it as "somewhat" important.48 In a more recent World
Public Opinion survey, respondents in 17 of 21 countries placed compliance
with international law above national interest. 49
It is important to note that there may also be an anti-international law
lobby.so To the extent that such a lobby exists, its effects can be netted against
the PILL, and to the extent that the anti-international law lobby is stronger than
the PILL, then the PILL variable would simply be negative.
E. Toward a Model
The following discussion is intended to outline a model of how domestic
coalitions would be affected by, and would affect, international law.
48

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion and Foreign Pokcy 33 (2002), online
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Assume two states, H and F. Assume H and F each has exactly four
lobbies, and that the respective governments of H and F represent a fifth
"interest group," each with the policy goal profiles set forth below. Assume
perfect knowledge by each player of the policy preferences and magnitudes of
each lobby. Magnitude is a measure of the political valence of each lobby,
although as noted above it could include knowledge endowment as to
compliance. The model would involve four stages. In the first stage, the lobbies
in each country set contribution schedules to influence their government. In the
second stage, the governments negotiate an agreement. In the third stage,
lobbies (perhaps including new or different ones, and perhaps with different
magnitudes) lobby about compliance. In the last stage, governments
simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose whether or not to comply. In the
following discussion, I focus on two stages: t, when the governments negotiate
an agreement, and t 2 when the governments choose whether or not to comply.
But it is important to note that lobbies at the first and second stages would be
expected to anticipate the situation at the third and fourth stages, and respond
accordingly.
H lobbies:
either consumers seeking free trade in
J: policy goal is x (for example,
bananas imported to H, 51 or environmentalists seeking carbon
reduction).
K: policy goal is not x (for example, eitherimport competing producers
seeking protection in bananas in H, or oil companies seeking to avoid
carbon reduction).
L: policy goal is y (for example, either orange producer seeking free
trade in oranges exported to F, or separate group of environmentalists
seeking protection of the rain forest in F)
Ph: policy goal is adherence to international law at ti (Ph,) and
compliance with international law at

t2 (Ph2).

Assume that

Ph2 > Phi

(international law lobbies are harmed more by non-compliance than by
non-adherence).
Gh: government of H (excluding the effects already reflected by J,K,L
and Ph), as a separate "interest group" that seeks to maximize its voting

support by maximizing general public welfare in connection, inter alia,
with adherence and compliance and concern for reciprocity and

51

These policies in parentheses are merely provided as examples. Any policy where reciprocity is
valuable and the magnitudes are appropriate could be substituted. For example, y could be
protection of the ozone layer, while x is avoidance of terrorist attacks. The point is that within
each domestic system, there is (i) a lobby on each side of the contention regarding the domestic
measure, (ii) a lobby that cares about foreign measures, (iii) a public international law lobby that
cares about the growth of and compliance with international law, and (iv) the government which,
aside from its interest in lobbies' support, is also interested in public welfare as a way to increase
voting support.
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retaliation in connection with non-adherence at t (Ghl) and noncompliance at t 2 (Gh2). Assume that Gh2 > Ghl (there is greater concern

for retaliation against non-compliance than against non-adherence).
If domestic equilibrium at t, were x (the preferred policy of J), that is J > K, then
no international law would be needed to induce x. However, assume that at t1 , K
> J. (We are assuming international law with "depth.") Therefore, the domestic
equilibrium at t, is not x: H would not enter into an international agreement.
However, assume that J + L + Phl+ Ghl > K. Therefore, international law that
engages the lobbying power of L could cause a shift from not x to x at the
adherence stage (t1), inducing adherence to a rule of international law.
Alternatively, or in addition, it is possible that Ph1 or Ghl could be sufficient to
overcome K. Once the rule of international law is established, there is a shift
from Ph to Ph2, and from Ghl to Gh2 . According to our assumptions, these shifts
would be expected to increase the tendency to comply. In order to determine
actual compliance, we would need to examine whether at any given time J + L +
Ph2+ Gh2 > K. Ph2 and Gh would be expected to vary over time.
It is important to note that in this model, international law only affects
state behavior pursuant to the above assumptions regarding relative magnitudes
of lobbies. This model does not utilize "compliance pull" or other effect of
international law, separate from the force of the national lobbies that care about
compliance with international law. But in assuming that Phi < Ph2 , and Ghl <
Gh2, we are assuming a tendency to comply, conditional on adherence. The
magnitudes of these differences tell us something about the level of vulnerability
of continued compliance to changes in other factors.
Also, recall that the lobbies are not the only determinants of public policy.
Under the assumptions of the Grossman-Helpman model, public welfare enters
the equation through G by virtue of voting.5 2 Therefore, an international legal
rule that increases public welfare is more likely to achieve both adherence and
compliance.
As outlined above, H's decision to adhere and comply is partially
dependent on the decision of F to reciprocate, inducing L to lobby for
adherence and compliance. The situation in F is a mirror image of H, with
adherence and compliance by both increasing their joint welfare, according to
the assumptions of this model. The F lobbies are described below.
F lobbies:
M: policy goal is y (for example, either consumers seeking free trade in
oranges imported to F, orprotection of rain forest).
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N: policy goal is not y (for example, either import competing producers
seeking protection in oranges in F, or seeking to develop the rain
forest).
Q: policy goal is x (for example, either banana producer seeking free
trade in bananas exported to H, or oil companies seeking to avoid
carbon reduction).
Pcf policy goal is adherence to international law at ti (Pfi) and
compliance with international law at t2 (Pf2). Assume that Pn > Pfn
(international law lobbies are harmed more by non-compliance than by
non-adherence).
Gfo government of F (excluding the effects already reflected by M, N,
Q, and Pf), as a separate "lobby" that seeks to maximize its voting
support by maximizing general public welfare in connection, inter alia,
with adherence, compliance, and concern for reciprocity and retaliation
in connection with non-adherence at ti (Gfl) and non-compliance at t2
(Ge). Assume that Gn > Gn- (there is greater concern for retaliation
against non-compliance than against non-adherence).
Assume that at t1 , N > M + Pf, + Gfn, therefore domestic equilibrium is not y.
However, assume that, M + Q + Pf, + G, > N. The situation of F then parallels
that of H.
Therefore, if H and F are considered separately, they have separate
equilibria of not x and not y. But at t1 , if H and F are considered together-their
ability to interact is an exogenous shock to each of their separate equilibriathey are able to reach an international exchange of policy. This international
exchange of policy is politically Pareto superior, as it results in greater support
for each government.53 We have assumed that L and Q (the parties in each of H
and F concerned about the measures taken by the other state), when their
respective influence is added to J and L, respectively, is able to overcome K and
N, respectively. So, at tj, under interaction, a new equilibrium arises, of x and y,
inducing adherence to an international agreement.
However, at t2 , the compliance phase, this structure may take on the
characteristics of a prisoner's dilemma game. That is, if H can defect and move
to not x, while F plays y, it might be that H can garner the most political
support.54 However, assuming all positions remain the same as at t1 , if H
defects, then F can defect in response, resulting in a non-cooperative
equilibrium. But, assuming that P2 > 1,and G2 > G1 , the differences in these
factors may be sufficient in magnitude, especially when aggregated over time or
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over multiple cooperation contexts, to exceed the value of defection, avoiding
the prisoner's dilemma.ss
Note that at tj, the forces in H and F supporting not x and not y,
respectively, will be expected to oppose the creation of the international linkage
that changes the equilibrium to their detriment. In addition, these forces will be
expected to oppose the creation of international legal rules that will result in the
shift from P1 to P 2 and from G, to G 2 , which these forces anticipate will entrench
their disfavored policy. However, the fact that they anticipate these effects does
not mean that they have the lobbying power to avoid these effects. Nevertheless,
they may seek to engage sovereigntist or other generally opposing forces in
order to supplement their policy position.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND SCHOLARSHIP
A. Implications
Further development and use of this model will depend on policymakers'
ability to identify proxies for power and interest of lobbies. In international
economic law areas, wealth and amount at stake may serve as a proxy. In other
areas, such as human rights or international environmental law, size of
membership in relevant groups, such as ethnic groups, and survey data regarding
the magnitude of individual concern, may be helpful. However, as a guide to
negotiators and policymakers, this approach may be useful without further
formalization. If it is helpful to know about compliance, there is no more
complete or precise approach. The test of a model is not whether it answers
every question perfectly, but whether it answers questions that need to be
answered in a useful way and better than the other tools available.
What systematic features does this model exhibit?
1. First, because we assume that P2 > P1, and G 2 > G,, this model
exhibits a systematic bias towards compliance, conditional on
adherence. However, while this is a systematic bias, it cannot be
expected to overcome changes in other parameters in all cases.
Moreover, the magnitude of this systematic bias depends on the
individual magnitude of P 2 and G 2 in each state. This focus on P 2 and
G 2 may either supplement or supplant the "liberal states" theory,
depending on the cause of P2 and G 2. These differentials between P 2
and G 2 may also be understood within a reputation or reciprocity
model, as determinants of the importance to the particular state of its
55
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"reputation" or of diffuse reciprocity in determining whether to
comply. In a prisoner's dilemma model, these differentials can be seen
as a measure of the extent to which the shadow of the future,
including compliance in connection with other rules, affects the
behavior of the subject state.
2. Second, this model accepts that domestic lobbies may vary in intensity
from t, to t 2. This variation may be for exogenous reasons, or it may
systematically be that lobbies that achieve their preferences at t,
become wealthier or otherwise stronger at t2 as a result. If this is the
case, we would again see a systematic bias towards compliance,
conditional on adherence.
How can policy preferences change in ways that might give rise to noncompliance?
1. First, the timing of performance by one state may differ from the
timing of performance by another, and this may give rise to asset
specificity after t, adherence. In this context, by "asset specificity," I
mean that the investment in compliance by one party would be less
valuable to that party if the other party does not carry out its side of
the bargain. This is no different from any other asset specificity in
contracting. But under asset specificity, a greater role for a PILL, or
for governmental preferences for compliance, may be required to
induce compliance with international law, as the H lobbies that benefit
from the asset specific investment by F would have little reason to
lobby in support of compliance after performance by F. Obviously, to
the extent that performance is expected to take place symmetrically at
multiple moments over an extended period of time, this type of asset
specificity may be reduced. If the period of time is finite, it is still
possible for cooperation to unravel in anticipation of the last period.
2. Second, either state may have acted strategically or opportunistically at
the adherence stage, developing a coalition to adhere in order to reap
benefits that may arise from adherence, with no intent or political
power to actually comply. This is a sub-case of the first type of change,
as it assumes that the non-defecting state gives some performance
after t, adherence, while the defecting state fails to comply at t2.
3. Third, the political magnitude of various lobbies may change over
time. A prediction made at t, regarding the lobbying valence of various
lobbies may have a high probability of being accurate at t1 , but would
be expected to become less likely to be accurate over time. Consider,
for example, circumstances of sudden great political change, such as a
revolution.
4. Fourth, this model suggests that uncertainty regarding domestic
coalitions to support compliance would increase over time. It thus
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might suggest that governments may assess the value of reciprocal
commitments over a delimited period of time, rather than over an
indefinite period of time. This would reduce the magnitude of the
shadow of the future in inducing compliance at any stage.
5. Fifth, we can show that international retaliation, reputation, and
reciprocity cannot ensure compliance. Compliance will always depend
on the constellation of domestic political forces in the relevant state.
6. Sixth, we may be able to suggest reasons for bilateralism versus
multilateralism, mutatis mutandir bilateralism might allow for the
construction of more nuanced political coalitions to induce
compliance, individualized to the particular international legal
transaction.
7. Seventh, we might be able to explain the use by domestic
governments of international legal commitments at tj to lock in a
policy that is supported by a domestic equilibrium at tj, where there is
a preference over future policy. Government at tj may do so by
increasing the effect of P and G through adherence, and inducing
support from a separate domestic lobby through reciprocity.
8. Eighth, we may be able to assist in determining whether entry into a
particular international legal commitment is done insincerely, without
intent to comply. Counterparties would wish to evaluate whether there
is sufficient domestic support for compliance with the commitments
on which they rely.
B. Relation to Existing Literature and Directions for Future
Research
1. Relation to existing literature.
This Article suggests a rationalist model of compliance that focuses on
domestic politics. It provides no proof, however, that rational interest-based
politics determines compliance. So it does not present an empirical challenge to
constructivist theories that focus on other drivers of domestic politics.
Constructivist theories focus on the role of ideas and on the social construction
of meaning as an influence on behavior.5 Social practices and interaction may

56
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change ideas and may therefore change behavior." To some degree,
constructivism may be reconciled with a rationalist approach that would accept
malleable preferences and the importance of non-material preferences.
One influential constructivist school of thought-the transnational legal
process school-suggests that international law and institutions may play a role
in inducing changes in state preferences through "norm internalization."" An
extension of this school utilizes sociological tools to examine the role of
international law in an acculturation process." The managerial theory of
compliance, developed by Abram and Antonia Chayes,o focuses on a specific
set of domestic determinants of compliance. However, the one domestic
determinant of compliance that this Article highlights-the possibility of gain by
particular domestic coalitions-is excluded from the determinants that form the
core of their theory. The managerial approach explicitly rejects a focus on "a
Only further empirical work
narrow set of externally defined 'interests'. ...
will help us to determine the relative power of interests versus the factors
highlighted by constructivist theories.
Much of the pre-existing rationalist literature developing the relationship
between domestic politics and international relations focuses on international
relations writ large, rather than international law in particular. While some of this
literature makes a turn toward international law, where it does so, its focus is
often on "cooperation" in the form of adherence to rules, rather than the later,
and more critical, moment of compliance with rules that is the subject of this
Article.62 Indeed, whether a counterparty is expected to comply will often
determine the willingness of a state to adhere.
In his seminal 1978 article, The Second Image Reversed: The InternationalSources
of Domestic Politics, 63 Peter Gourevitch develops the implications of the fact that
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Hopf, 23 Intl Security at 178-79 (explaining the power of social practices in establishing the outer
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Duke LJ 983 (2005).
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the international system can affect the structure of domestic politics. This is the
second image (an image of the impact of domestic politics on international
relations) reversed.64 The present Article extends Gourevitch's point further, but
focuses on the interrelation between the second image reversed and the second
image.
In his leading article, Diplomacy and Domestic Poliics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games," Putnam focuses attention on the role of international pressure-foreign
demands-in inducing domestic political change. Putnam saw that the "second
image" approach-focusing on domestic causes of international relations, and
the "second image reversed" approach-focusing on international causes of
domestic political phenomena, were inadequate by themselves. He claims that:
A more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy
and international relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, interest
groups (both economic and noneconomic), legislators, and even public
opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and institutional
arrangements.66

Putnam's two-level game theory suggests that the role of the national
government in international relations is to mediate between two separate
"games," the international game and the domestic game: "The unusual
complexity of this two-level game is that moves that are rational for a player at
one board (such as raising energy prices, conceding territory, or limiting auto
imports) may be impolitic for that same player at the other board."6
While this provides important insights, especially as to the position of
government officials caught in between, the model introduced in this Article
suggests that there is no real conflict between these games. Rather, opportunities
in the international game shape the strategy for maximizing an aggregate basket
of preferences in the domestic game. The state is always maximizing its
preferences under constraint. It is as erroneous to say that there is an
inconsistency between the international and the domestic as it is to say that a
corporation, entering the market, is in conflict with the market. It seeks the
benefits of the market, in terms of the ability to purchase and to sell. 6' The
corporation must decide whether to make or to buy-whether to be satisfied
64

The first image examines the role of individuals in international relations. Kenneth Waltz
developed the idea of three images. The second focuses on the effects of domestic politics on
international relations, while the third focuses on the effects of the international system on
international relations. Consider Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State, and War(Columbia 1959).
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with internal production-or whether to contract with others. It only contracts
to buy where this is superior to making. Similarly, in Coasean terms, where
outsiders impose an externality on the corporation, the corporation only
contracts with the outsider where it achieves a better outcome than acting on its
own. Putnam sees the opportunity for national gain in the market of
international relations as the exception, rather than the rule: "On occasion,
however, clever players will spot a move on one board that will trigger
realignments on other boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise unattainable
objectives.""
The unstated assumption in Putnam's theory is that the national negotiator
has some measure of autonomy that allows the negotiator to compromise
between domestic and foreign interests, and that the national negotiator is not
concerned with maximizing the national interests outcome. But there is no need
to assume an agency problem. A more elegant model, as developed in this
Article, sees the national negotiator as maximizing national interests under
internationalconstraint,with the additional possibility of agency problems.
Putnam is right in his core insight that if we examine the domestic game,
we may find that there is an opportunity for a domestic equilibrium which would
not exist except for the existence of the international game (what Putnam refers
to as a "synergistic linkage").70 This is not the exception, however, but the rule in
international cooperation and international law. As Jongryn Mo points out,
domestic bargaining is endogenous to international cooperation-it is affected
by opportunities for international cooperation. 7 ' Domestic bargaining is
constrained by the range of international opportunities, wherever the
international opportunities allow a superior outcome compared to a purely
domestic equilibrium. We must assume that international cooperation will only
be efficient, and will only ensue, where it allows a superior aggregate outcome,
either from a public choice or from a public interest standpoint.
This Article focuses on the role of realignments on the domestic board: on
the possibility that entry into, and compliance with, international law is always
motivated by either the prospect of change in domestic coalitions that the new
international law causes, or by the prospect of avoiding unattractive change from
an existing beneficial coalition. It focuses on the implications of these
realignments for compliance. If there were no modification of domestic
coalitions, there would be no purpose for the international law--once it is
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accepted that compliance is always a domestic political decision, the international
law will only be effective if it modifies domestic politics.
Mo formalizes and extends Putnam's conjecture that greater domestic
constraints can be a bargaining advantage in international negotiations.72 As
discussed above, this conjecture seems dependent on a particular definition of
the state's preferences, and on a particular definition of advantage. That is,
constraint can only be seen as an advantage if constraint is separated, and
understood to be independent, from the state's actual preferences. However, it is
difficult to understand how this type of artificial constraint could arise.
Putnam seems to assume that the state's true preferences are distinct from
those expressed in domestic politics, and so it can be an advantage in achieving
the true preferences if the constraint, which is visible and credible to
counterparties in international negotiations, causes them to give up more of the
surplus from agreement than they otherwise would. This concept of constraint
as advantage would be more logical if the constraint were a false constraint, or a
false negotiating signal.
Otherwise, domestic constraint can be understood more simply in terms of
domestic preferences, and the power that domestic constraint confers is simply
the power of the negotiation concept of BATNA: the "best alternative to a
negotiated agreement." This "power" is actually the simple fact that where the
surplus generated by a negotiated agreement is less than that generated by an
alternative unilateral action, we can expect the actor to choose the alternative
unilateral action.
The liberal theory of international relations, associated with the work of
Andrew Moravcsik, calls attention to the domestic sources of international
relations preferences.73 Thus, "the demands of individuals and societal groups
are treated as analytically prior to politics."74 Liberal theory focuses on stable
preferences of states, resulting from the aggregation of individual preferences by
the state's political mechanisms. Governments then act purposively in world
politics on the basis of these preferences. Thus, preferences are the cause of
state behavior within a world system that provides constraints based on other
states' preferences. Liberal theory accepts that while the state's preferences are
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defined in accordance with liberal theory, other theories, including realism and
institutionalism, may generate hypotheses that explain behavior.
States are dynamic systems, with individuals and groups of individuals
vying with one another for influence. To the extent that these systems are
assumed to be closed, it may be appropriate to expect a fairly stable equilibrium
among these individuals and groups. Coalition politics may be relatively stable,
with change occurring based on demographic, technological, ideational, or other
factors that disrupt the equilibrium. The market of international relations
provides an additional, dynamic source of stimuli that may disrupt existing
national political equilibria. On the other hand, as the market of international
relations becomes deeper and more efficient, it will increasingly be a part of a
normal national equilibrium.
Thus, while as Putnam explains, "it is fruitless to debate whether domestic
politics really determine international relations, or the reverse,"7 the relationship
between domestic politics and international relations has a particular directional
structure. Liberal theory envisions states entering the "market" of international
relations to satisfy preferences.77 The "market" is a constraint: all preferences
cannot be satisfied. Similarly, a non-monopolist/monopsonist corporation
entering the market cannot determine alone the price at which it sells and buys.
And, as this Article argues, the state is a dynamic aggregator of individual, group,
and coalition preferences. As it turns out, the state may be theorized as an
aggregator of a variable basket of preferences. We always begin with individual
preferences and move up the vertical ladder of hierarchy according to the
principle of subsidiarity in order to better satisfy those preferences.
2. Directions for future research.
Future research will be needed to provide empirical support for the model
proposed in this Article. Models of this type encounter difficulty in measuring
the magnitudes of various factors, and must estimate or use proxies for these
factors. Future extensions of this model would follow some of the work done in
connection with models of domestic-law compliance. Important extensions
might include factoring in uncertainty regarding enforcement and factoring in
the role and choice of enforcement resources and institutions.
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If it were possible to estimate the general magnitudes of P 2 and G 2 for each
state, we could determine the relative propensity of those states to comply.
Perhaps these magnitudes are what is meant by "reputation" in theories that
consider reputation as a type of information, as opposed to a reference to
collective punishment of a transgressor. One strategy for empirical testing might
compare compliance measures to the relative number of members of the
International Law Association (an international organization comprised of
national branches in forty-four countries around the world), in order to examine
whether a greater concentration of international lawyers is correlated with
greater propensity to comply. However, it could be that causation runs in both
directions, requiring more nuanced empirical strategies. It might also be useful to
compare compliance measures to the number of other international legal rights
that a particular state has. Here, the correlation might be positive if additional
rights provide greater opportunities for engagement of domestic lobbies that
benefit from these rights. On the other hand, it might be negative if additional
rights exacerbate a collective action problem in lobbying for compliance.
If it were possible to estimate the magnitudes of P, and G, for each state,
we could determine the relative propensity of those states to adhere. This would
allow a social scientific approach to claims of exceptionalism in connection with
adherence to international law.

IV. CONCLUSION
This Article theorizes that international law is made by strategic states
willing to reduce their autonomy along certain dimensions in order to increase
the satisfaction of their preferences along other dimensions, where after the
commensuration of these two dimensions, each state's government counts itself
better off. The mechanism of the state's decision-making regarding this tradeoff
and commensuration is domestic politics. In this theory, when domestic
coalition A stands to achieve a benefit greater than the loss that is expected by
domestic coalition B, coalition A is able to enter the political arena and
overcome coalition B, all other things being equal. Where an international
transaction-one type of which is international law-could result in a political
surplus, that surplus may induce a coalition to act to achieve it.
The Article has also developed a rationalist theory of compliance with
international law that takes account of the internal decision-making process of
states. It has always been true that the domestic public policy process has
formed coalitions in order to make public policy, and that there have always
been dissenters. The international relations context can be understood as an
expansion of the possibilities for tradeoffs and agreement-for formation of
coalitions. The set of possible coalitions that may be formed is effectively
increased by the ability to engage in international legal agreements.
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Formation and compliance with international law is dependent on the
identification and negotiation of efficient transnational political linkages. In an
important sense, the scope of domestic politics is extended by the capability of
entering into international agreements. While we do not have a continuous
transnational political system, international law forms a transmission belt that
can link domestic lobbies transnationally. Indeed, by virtue of the expansion of
the scope of the possibilities for Pareto improving political transactions, the
international extension of the scope of domestic politics, where it occurs, would
generally be expected to increase domestic welfare. Of course, the move from
domestic political welfare to actual welfare depends on the extent to which
domestic politics reflects actual welfare. In any event, a government that wishes
to deliver the most to its people, or at least to get the most political support, will
be required to enter the international law market for some transactions.
The rationalist theory of compliance developed here provides a novel way
of analyzing the possibilities for compliance with international law. It suggests a
number of empirical research strategies that may be followed in order to
evaluate and possibly revise or extend the theory developed here. Perhaps more
importantly, it provides a useful template by which states may evaluate the
possibility that their counterparties will comply with their international legal
obligations. As states approach important international public policy issues such
as global warming, terrorism, and international financial crisis, this evaluative
tool will allow them to be realistic regarding the utility of proposed international
legal rules.
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